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Abstract. Referred to as the new oil, undoubtedly personal data is a valuable 
resource for organizations. Contrary, it is still blurred, to what extent individuals 
value their data even though, in a digitized world, users are requested to exchange 
their data for adequate services. Former research on individuals’ valuation of 
personal data result in scattered, partly contradictious values, depending on the 
data type, context, and the measurement method. In this study, we aimed to 
facilitate the valuation for individuals by applying a new and promising 
measurement methodology: the participants of our field experiment had the 
chance to sell their selfies in a name-your-own-price auction with repeated 
bidding and feedback loops. As a result, 39% of our participants were willing to 
donate or sell their selfies with a median of 5€. Additionally, bidding clusters 
were identified. Implications for research on the valuation of personal data in 
terms of privacy are discussed. 
Keywords: Value of Personal Data, Privacy, Willingness-to-Sell, Willingness-
to-Accept, Name-Your-Own-Price Auction  
1 Introduction 
There is no question that we live in a period of time where personal information as a 
resource is becoming increasingly important. Discussions about personal data as the 
new oil, gold, or fuel are ubiquitous [1, 2] and the successes of data-driven companies 
like Google outcompetes traditional business models [3]. Notably, five of the top six 
companies according to their market value in the world are data-driven companies [4, 
5]. Thus, personal information is a valuable asset for organizations and they already 
compete for profiting from it [6].  
In contrast, taking the perspective of individuals, the benefits they get from releasing 
personal data is blurred as they typically do not receive a monetary compensation. 
Obviously, users benefit from using online services based on personal data, but still 
privacy concerns about the disclosure of personal information have increased, inherited 
with the feeling of being unfairly treated [7-9]. Indeed, a study in the Netherlands shows 
that individuals perceive that they are not getting enough value for their data, as 89% 
state that the industry benefits the most from data economy [10]. Thus, individuals seem 




However, to assess the current data handling processes and regulation approaches, 
individuals need to know the value of their data more precisely in order to be able to 
compare the costs of potential privacy losses in terms of data disclosure with the 
benefits of data usage [11]. In an attempt to investigate individuals’ valuation of 
personal data, recent research measured either users’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for an 
enhanced privacy level or their willingness-to-sell (WTS) personal information [e.g., 
12, 13, 14]. Yet, resulting valuations are scattered between studies depending on the 
type of data, the context in which the studies are conducted, and the research 
methodology [15]. So, it seems that individuals’ valuation of personal data is not trivial.  
Although personal data is reminiscent of traditional valuable resources, it is unlike 
these previous resources because of its infinity and the fact that it does not consume 
itself [16]. Further, personal data cannot be compared with ordinary goods for which 
individuals can set up a price more easily, as data can be sensitive and may make the 
disclosing person identifiable [17]. This makes it even more complicated for individuals 
to put a price tag on it. Therefore, research in the field of valuation of personal data 
requires carefully selected study designs and in turn measurement methods that can 
handle individuals’ potentially vague awareness of the valuation of personal data due 
to its specificity and minor experience of its monetarization. In this vein, we have 
conducted a study to measure individuals’ valuation of personal data with a new and 
promising methodology, which is already applied in other contexts for the pricing of 
‘opaque’ goods [18]: a name-your-own-price (NYOP) auction. This methodology can 
identify the bidders’ unique, lowest price for personal data separately for every 
individual, as it does not require synchronous bids [18-20]. Further, NYOP auctions 
can be implemented with a repeated bidding option that give individuals the chance to 
receive feedback if the bids are too high in order to state re-considered bids. This can 
facilitate individuals’ establishment of the price, using the feedback as a source of 
information and as a trigger to reveal the lowest price [21, 22].  
By strengthening the external validity of measuring individuals’ value of personal 
information with a new methodology, we are aiming to answer the following research 
question: What monetary value do users assign to their personal information, when 
being able to state several values after receiving feedback in a name-your-own-price 
auction with repeated bidding? 
In order to investigate this, we conducted a field experiment where participants could 
sell personal information in form of selfies in a name-your-own-price (NYOP) auction. 
We included a repeated bidding option, to make participants feel more comfortable with 
the situation as they could bid again after receiving feedback about the valuation and 
thus, can use the haggling process to overcome a lack of information due to low 
experience with monetized personal data [22]. Indeed, the results indicate that 
participants used their chances to bid several times, leading to a median final selling 
price of 5€. Analysis of the provided bids further show different clusters of bidders, 
indicating that the valuation of personal data is still very individual. 
The paper is structured as follows: First, we summarize the theoretical background 
regarding the valuation of personal information in terms of privacy. In the subsequent 
chapter, the field study is presented with its methodology and results, before we close 




2 Valuation of Personal Information 
With the rise of data-driven business models, research and practice are concerned about 
the valuation of personal data from an individual perspective. Specifically, they are 
interested in individuals’ valuation of privacy in order to understand their data 
disclosure decisions. In these attempts, scholars were either investigating individuals’ 
willingness-to-sell (WTS) data [e.g., 23, 24] or their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
protecting their personal data [e.g., 12, 25] in order to measure the monetary value of 
data. However, former research studies are scattered and discordant [15]. Table 1 gives 
an overview of former studies investigating individuals’ valuation of personal data 
along with their results, type of data under investigation as well as the applied 
measurement method. 
Table 1. Overview of prior valuation of personal data studies                                 







Results (median or mean) 






11.42€ for research & 22.85€ for 
commercial purposes (median) 






43€ (median) for research & two-
fold for commercial purpose 






88.71€ for academic and 
commercial purposes (median) 























BDM (mean):  
8.32€ for preferences 
14.88€ for contact details  
Close-ended questions:  
24/24 accepted 5€ for preferences 








Age: 51.22€ (mean) 















Open-ended Questions:  
12/12 accepted 0.22€ WTS-offers 
12/14 accepted 0.89€ WTS-offers 
1/7 accepted 0.22€ WTP-offers 
1/14 accepted 0.89€ WTP-offers 
Close-ended questions: 
Min. WTS: 28.30€ (mean) 
Max. WTP: 0.71€ (mean) 
Bauer et al. 
(2012) 

























No market awareness: 0€ (median) 
Market awareness: 5€ (median)  
WTS:  
49% WTS=0€ 
23% 0€ < WTS < 4006€ 
28% WTS > 4006€ 
Krasnova et 
al. (2009)  
WTP SNS Conjoint 
Analysis 
Between 14.14€ and 17.24€ a year 
Schreiner & 
Hess (2015) 
WTP SNS BDM 0.63€ (mean) 
 
As shown in Table 1, the valuations for location data for instance vary between 11€ to 
88€ even for the same measurement method of a reverse Vickrey auction due to 
different samples and variations in the study design [13, 26, 27]. By applying a survey 
with close-ended questions, Barak et al. identified a valuation of only 8€ [24] enlarging 
the range of results for location data even further. Supplementary, Benndorf & 
Normann found evidence that the measurement method can have a remarkable impact 
on the valuation, as the results for selling SNS details vary up to 10€ between Becker–
DeGroot–Marschak mechanism (BDM) and close-ended questions for the same sample 
[28]. Similarly, Grossklags and Acquisti, ascertain that individuals requested a 
minimum price of 28€ for selling their weight information when being asked openly, 
while in the same study, individuals also accepted offers for even 0.22€ [14]. To spread 
the results even more, weight information was sold for a minimum WTS of 65€ in an 
auction study by Huberman et al. [23].  
Grossklags and Acquisti also investigated individuals’ willingness-to-pay for 
protecting their weight information and found a valuation of 0.71€ conforming a 
general gap between WTS and WTP [14]. The tendency that individuals demand more 
money for an object compared to the amount of money they are willing to pay for it, is 
widely known in research [29] and seems to hold for personal data as well [14]. Indeed, 
most WTP-studies report rather low values, however, also with variations within the 
prices. While Bauer et al. and Spiekermann & Korunovska for example found that 
individuals are not willing to pay a single Euro for their SNS details, the median 
increased to 5€ when data will be traded [6, 30]. Other studies, like the conjoint analysis 
by Krasnova et al. show that a user would be ready to pay 14€-17€ per year if no 
demographic information is used for personalized advertising, while Schreiner & Hess’ 
BDM-participants reported to be willing to pay only 0.63€ for privacy control features 
within a Facebook premium version [12, 25].  
To sum up, investigations on the valuation of personal information from an 
individual perspective is context-specific and depending on a variety of factors like the 




implications for decision makers and theory. However, it also demonstrates that 
individuals have difficulties in assessing a stable and confident monetary value 
associated with personal information. This was also clearly confirmed by Brush et al. 
who reported that several of their participants found it challenging to value data and 
some even tried to ask for hints about what other participants had bid [27]. In our study 
we address the difficulties in assessing a value of personal information by relying on a 
novel measurement method. We chose a NYOP auction, because it facilitates 
individuals’ valuation as they receive feedback. Further, it is not subject to a 
hypothetical bias as individuals were incentivized. In order to be transparent and 
unambiguous, we clearly explained how the data will be used and by which party.  
3 Experimental Study  
3.1 Methodology of the Experimental Study 
In order to investigate individuals’ valuation of personal data in an auspicious new way, 
we conducted a field experiment using a name-your-own-price auction with repeated 
bidding options where individuals could sell their selfies. In the following we will 
describe the experimental setting, the NYOP mechanism, and the study realization.  
 
Experimental Setting. Following the call by Dinev et al. for more realistic study 
scenarios capturing actual behavior, we were aiming to provide an experimental design 
for our willingness-to-sell study, where participants perceive the disclosure of personal 
information as a natural and comprehensive task that leads to an actual sale [31]. As 
our natural environment is the university, it seems appropriate to develop a scenario 
that fits into this environment. Thus, students were the target group. We developed a 
fictional campaign, that our chair is looking for the “faces of our university” to advertise 
our institution among interested pupils and potential new students. Therefore, the 
alleged aim of this campaign was to collect selfies of students for marketing purposes 
in order to promote the university in an authentic and sympathetic way with the slogan 
“from students for students”. For the purpose of this campaign, we implemented a 
website containing a detailed description of the presented purpose as well as the NYOP 
auction, with which the students could allegedly sell their selfies to us. We decided to 
focus on selfies as personal information, as selfies always depict the subjects’ faces 
which turns a picture into personal information compared to ordinary photos. 
Furthermore, selfies are fashionable and omnipresent and thus, assures familiarity of 
young students and reduces the risk of misunderstanding [32].  
 
Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) Auction with Repeated Bidding. This type of 
auction is based on an interactive pricing process between buyer and seller, in which 
both parties are actively involved in finding the price [33, 34]. It is referred to as a 
haggling process where no average or market price is disclosed [18, 35]. Traditionally, 
NYOP auctions are initiated by the product sellers to investigate buyers’ willingness-
to-pay without disclosing the lowest price [e.g., 35]. However, likewise studies building 




individuals’ willingness-to-sell. In doing so, the buyer sets a maximum price (also 
referred to as the treshold) at which he or she is willing to buy the good, but does not 
provide any information about it [19, 36]. The potential seller can then initate the first 
offer and if it meets or undershots the threshold, the sale is made in the amount of the 
value offered by the seller [19, 37]. However, if the bid is above the limit, it is rejected, 
but the seller has again the chance to repeat his or her bidding [18]. 
We opted for a NYOP auction for the following reasons: First, it is applicable for 
‘opaque’ goods where the price is non-transparent [18]. Second, NYOP is used to elicit 
the lowest price of the bidder and thus, reflects individuals’ actual willingness-to-sell 
transferrable to real-life situations [18]. Besides, in contrast to a “one price for all” 
strategy, it identifies individuals’ unique selling price [19]. Fourth, depending on the 
design adjustments of the auction, the initiator of the auction can allow several bids in 
chronological order until the threshold is undershot (repeated bidding) [38]. Thus, 
individuals receive feedback if the bids are too high, which can serve as valuable 
information within the haggling process [22, 39], and therefore makes the method 
appropriate for individuals’ vague awareness of the valuation of personal information. 
Indeed, former research has shown, that individuals’ loose statement of a price without 
any reference information is associated with cognitive effort and therefore they prefer 
an alternative in which they can select a price or receive information about the 
valuation, for example by given reference price ranges [35]. However, this would go 
along with an impeding of the accuracy of the valuation [35] and a biasing in the 
direction of the external provided reference information [40]. In contrast, the feedback 
provided by a NYOP auction with repeated bidding option gives individuals something 
to go on in a subtler way without anchoring them too much as no initial value which 
then needs to be adjusted [41] is given. A fifth reason is that compared to reverse 
Vickrey auction often applied in studies investigating individuals’ valuation of personal 
data [e.g., 23, 42], NYOP auctions do not only award one bidder [37]. So not only one 
participant has the chance to sell his or her personal information, but all who bid 
accordingly. Indeed, with NYOP there is no need to receive the bids at the same time, 
as asynchronously arriving bids can be accepted or rejected immediately if the threshold 
is set before [20].  
Due to the design decision on repeated bids, we had to fix the threshold at a low 
value, because a higher value would have entailed the risk of losing information about 
a low willingness-to-sell. Thus, we decided to set the threshold to 1€.  
We further decided to limit the amount of bids to three, as previous studies on the 
design of NYOP auctions are based on the assumption that sellers include frictional 
costs in their choice of bids [38]. Frictional costs are referred to mental efforts for 
navigating through the website, typing in the selected bids, as well as occuring from the 
waiting time until the bid is accepted or rejected [38, 39]. In order to prevent these 
frictional costs from taking on too much importance, we limited the number of bids to 
three. This also has the advantage of better comparability of the results of all 





Figure 1. NYOP mechanism of our field experiment, adapted from [38]  
Study Realization. We implemented a website for our NYOP auction. When entering 
the website, the participants were informed about our proposal of buying selfies for the 
chair’s campaign, but we did not provide any price information. In addition to the 
NYOP mechanism, participants also had the opportunity to donate their selfies for the 
same presented purpose. This was even possible after making an offer. To meet the 
challenge that interested sellers might not have an appropriate selfie ready, we provided 
the chance to bid immediately, but upload the selfie later. However, we clearly stated 
that the money will only be paid off when the selfie is uploaded. For this purpose, we 
provided a separate link. 
In order to distribute the website to students in our university, the field experiments’ 
website was integrated into a cover online survey. Thus, the participants did not know 
the real intention of the study. For our cover study, we decided to emphasize on 
advertisement as a topic as it is omnipresent and therefore interesting for students. To 
provide students with an additional incentive to participate in the survey, they received 
3€ in cash for responding to the online cover survey. The cover study consisted of 
different parts: After an introductory page providing all GDPR-relevant information, 
age and gender demographics were collected. Subsequently, different scales 
investigating participants’ perception of advertising were presented. After finishing the 
cover study, we informed the participants about our current campaign where we are 
looking for the ‘faces of our university’ and that they have the chance to gain additional 
money by participating. By clicking on the next-button, all participants of the former 
cover study were forwarded to our NYOP website where a detailed description of the 
auction was given and interested participants could directly type in their bids or donate 
their selfies as presented above. The participants who were not interested in bidding or 
donating a selfie at all, were able to return to the initial cover survey by clicking on a 
“no interest”-button where we informed about the real purpose of the fictive campaign.  
We advertised the cover study by distributing flyers on the campus and by setting up 
a post on our chairs’ Facebook profile. From the 186 responses, we had to remove 15 
due to bad data quality (incomplete or invalid data), leading to 171 complete data sets. 
The final sample consisted of 44 females (26%), 125 males (73%), and two unspecified 
genders (1%). The male quota is representing the gender distribution of our technology-
focused university. With a share of 75%, the majority of the participants were between 
18 and 25 years as expected due to our targeting on students. Further, 22% of the 




than 46 years. From the 171 participants, 67 individuals bid or donated, while the other 
104 directly returned to the cover survey.  
To analyze the data and present the distribution of the bids, we followed former 
studies on valuation of personal data applying reverse Vickrey auctions [11, 13, 43]. 
Additionally, we conducted a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and cluster analyses.  
3.2 Results of the Experimental Study  
The results of our field experiment are presented in the following sections, divided into 
insights about participants’ willingness-to-sell selfies for the advertised campaign and 
their willingness-to-donate selfies. 
 
Willingness-to-Sell Selfies. In total, 54 participants of our study (32%) bid. The 
bidders were on average 23.76 years old (SD = 3.77) and consisted of 20% women, 
78% men, and 2% unspecified genders. While 40 participants made full use of the 
possibility to bid three times, seven individuals provided only two offers, and other 
seven stated just one value. Following the assumption that the last bid provided in a 
NYOP auction bid series represents the participant’s actual willingness-to-sell, the final 
bid is of most interest. We further assume, that those who bid two values, have already 
reached their lowest, unique willingness-to-sell within the second offered value, thus, 
this is their last bid. Analogous, those who eventually provided only one value seem to 
have such a clear valuation in mind that they only want to express their lowest, unique 
value in one bid. Thus, we have allocated all of these bids under final bids. The mean 
of these final bids is 29.24€, with bids ranging from 997€ to 1 Cent. The median of 
these final bids is 5€. The big difference between mean and median and the relatively 
high standard deviation of 135.24 indicates that there are some very high valuations 
shifting the mean, which will be analyzed later on. In total, the threshold of 1€ was met 
or undershot 14 times leading to successful “sales” of selfies. Table 2 summarizes the 
statistics of the final bids together with the first and second bid.  
Table 2. Statistics of the starting bids, second bids, and final bids (in €)  
 First / Starting bid Second bid Third / Final bid 
Mean (SD) 93.28 (221.91) 50.95 (154.93) 29.24 (135.24) 
Median 25 10 5 
N 40 47 54 
[Max; Min] [999.99; 2] [998; 1.1] [997;0.01] 
 
Looking at the first and second bids, it is striking that the participants successively 
decreased the values of each bid. For analyzing the differences between the three bids, 
we conducted pairwise Wilcoxon signed-rank tests as our data was not normally 
distributed. This test is equivalent to a one-sample t-test conducted at signed ranks 
substituting the differences and is used for comparing the equality of medians of two 
samples [44, 45]. We compared the first bids with the second and the final bids as well 




two bids, we had to exclude seven values from the test which only provided one bid. 
The participants who provided two bids are analyzed within the comparison of the 
second and final bids. The test statistics summarized in Table 3 show that all bids are 
significantly different from each other with a large effect size (r) based on Cohen’s 
indexes [46, 47]. Based on the medians reported in Table 2, the first bids’ median is 
25€, while the second bid decreases by 40% leading to a median of 10€. The decrease 
from the second to the final bid is even higher with 50%. 
Table 3. Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics  
 z p-value N r 
First bid – Second bid -5.514 .000 40 .87 
Second bid – Final bid -5.912 .000 47 .86 
First bid – Final bid -5.513 .000 40 .87 
 
We further investigated the distribution of the bid series in more detail. As some of the 
bid series were appreciably higher than others, we conducted hierarchical cluster 
analyses (with median clustering, single linkage, and ward methods) for testing whether 
there are different bidder groups [48, 49]. For these analyses we imputed the missing 
values in the bid series where only one or two values were named by filling the absent 
bids with their only stated (or in the case where only one bid is missing with the second 
stated) bid. This is again in line with our assumption that the participants specified their 
valuation within their final bid which was for seven participants the only stated value.  
Surprisingly, the analyses revealed no clear clustering as the very high values were 
so scattered that it would lead to clusters with very few values. In a second step, we 
excluded the nine very high values from further analyses that were identified by the 
single linkage cluster analysis in addition to a z-based outlier-analysis. However, these 
bidders should not be seen as outliers in a traditional sense, as these are no measurement 
errors, but show the respondents’ extraordinary high value proposition of personal data 
in terms of privacy. These might be therefore seen as a group of privacy protectors. 
A re-iteration of the cluster analyses could identify three different clusters. Figure 2 
depicts the scatterplot of these bid series as well as the allocation of them to the clusters.  
 
 




The first cluster, colored in black (Figure 2) is characterized by the fact that all bidders 
start with 50€ as first bids. The second bid is around 20€ and the final one about 10€ as 
depicted in Table 4. We call this cluster striding out bidders as the steps between the 
bids are with absolute decreases of 30€ and 10€ wider compared to those from the 
subsequent clusters. While the bidders in the white cluster show a similar final bid as 
the black cluster, their starting bid was only 25€ in median. Hence, their absolute steps 
between the bids were smaller compared with the former cluster. Thus, we name them 
moderate bidders. Finally, the bidders allocated to the grey cluster bid relatively low in 
all three bids. The median of the final bid in this low bidders’ cluster meets our 
threshold of 1€.  
Table 4. Statistics of the hierarchical cluster analysis (ward method) in € 
Cluster (n)  First bid Second bid Final bid 
Black (n=6) 
Striding out bidders 
Mean 50 20.83 11.20 
Median 50 20 10 
White (n=17) 
Moderate bidders 
Mean 24.16 15.41 10.01 
Median 25 15 10 
Grey (n=22) 
Low bidders 
Mean 4.36 2.91 1.84 
Median 4.25 2 1 
 
Table 5 summarizes the demographics of the three bidder groups identified by the 
clusters analyses as well as the privacy protectors. However, an ANOVA test could not 
identify significant statistical differences between the groups with regard to age or 
gender of the participants.  
Table 5. Demographics of the bidder groups 
Bidder group Mean age (in years)  Women Men Others 
Privacy protectors 25.44 (SD = 4.79) 11.11% 77.78% 11.11% 
Striding out bidders 21.17 (SD = 1.34) 16.67% 83.33% 0% 
Moderate bidders 23.71 ( SD = 3.59) 17.65% 82.35% 0% 
Low bidders 23.82 (SD = 3.46) 27.27% 72.73% 0% 
 
Willingness-to-Donate Selfies. Additionally, participants had the chance to donate 
their selfies for the stated purpose. In total, 13 participants chose this option. From 
these, 38% were female, 62% male. The average age was 24.69 years (SD = 3.07). 
Three of these donators started to bid values in advance: One person bid 15€ before 
deciding to donate, another individual tried a 3€-bid first, and the third person bid 3€ 
and even 1€ so that the offer would be accepted if not donated. All results are discussed 





Within this study, we investigated individuals’ valuation of personal data by conducting 
a NYOP auction with repeated bidding and feedback loops. In the following the 
implications as well as limitations and future research suggestions are discussed and a 
conclusion is given.  
 
4.1 Implications of the Study 
Our study adds to research in several ways. First, our main theoretical contribution is 
the investigation of the value individuals assign to their personal information in a 
realistic, highly accessible, and comprehensive fashion. In this vein, we relied on a new 
and promising method, a NYOP auction with repeated bidding revealing individuals’ 
lowest, unique selling price [18, 19]. Due to the opportunity to bid several times after 
receiving feedback, individuals feel more comfortable by stating their valuation as they 
can use the haggling process as a source of information [22] and re-think their valuation 
with each bid. However, bidders are not anchored as no initial price as a starting point 
is presented [41]. In contrast to other auctions, sellers in NYOP auctions with a repeated 
bidding option can strategically start with a higher, internal generated value and then 
sequentially approach their own lowest bid based on feedback [39], revealing 
individuals’ actual WTS.  
Further analyses reveal subsequent implications. Thereby, it is striking that except 
for seven participants stating one value, most of the bidders took the chance to bid twice 
or three times. The three bids were significantly different from each other, decreasing 
by 40% from the first to the second and 50% from the second to the final bid. Looking 
deeper into the distribution of the bid series itself, we can observe some scattered, high 
bid series, referred to as the group of privacy protectors and three clusters of bidders 
with similar valuations. We could see very low bids of 1€ in median within the low 
bidders’ cluster. These make up 41% of the bid series. Another two groups of bid series, 
the moderate bidders (31% of the bidders) and the striding out bidders (11%), end up 
both at a final bid of about 10€ in median, but differentiate by their bidding strategies: 
While the bid series in the first cluster start with a higher bid of 50€, the bid series in 
the second cluster are more temperate, starting with 25€ in median. 
Lastly, the results show that 39% of the participants were willing to sell or donate a 
selfie. The 13 donations indicate that these participants seem to believe in the good 
cause of our campaign and a monetary compensation is not required. We further 
hypothesize that the three individuals that first bid and then decided to donate, 
perceived the threshold as “not worth” and then rather wanted to support the campaign 
by a donation. 
Beyond that, we show that our study participants would sell their selfie for 5€ in 
median. This monetary value seems convincing as current photo-selling platforms offer 
about 5€ to their users for one picture. For example, Candidly Images and Foap provide 
marketplaces where normal hobby photographers can sell their photos to interested 




(about 4.39 € based on exchange rate in August 2018) as a reward. Thus, it is indeed a 
price where demand and offer come about. 
To conclude, we found participants’ willingness-to-sell personal data in this field 
study to be realistic, but due to the scattered high values and the three different clusters, 
still to be very individual as well. This implies that valuation of personal information 
in terms of privacy is very sensitive, context-specific, and individual. As a result, it is 
not generalizable across humans.  
Beyond theoretical implications, our research also provides practical contributions. 
Not only since the German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed to tax the sale of 
personal data, the investigation of individuals’ valuation of personal data is becoming 
an important issue [52]. Already in 2014 Jentzsch indicated that a truthful valuation of 
personal data is an important matter in this time, as an increasing number of online 
platforms allow the sale of personal data to companies [42]. Indeed, more and more 
platforms appear (e.g., Datacoup, Data Fairplay, Datum) on which users can actively 
sell their personal data they are willing to disclose to interested companies and are 
therefore monetary compensated [53]. In this vein, our research contributes to practice 
by providing a mechanism that fosters the measurement of individuals’ unique, lowest 
valuation of personal data which can also help providers of data-selling platforms to 
evaluate their prices and assess their business chances.  
Secondly, when individuals use social networking sites (SNS) like Facebook or 
Instagram, they are agreeing to the term that the provider receives the license to use all 
shared images [54, 55]. Thus, individuals are using an apparent free service but they 
are paying with their personal information in terms of their photos and user behavior in 
general. In this vein, one could argue that SNS users do not value their photos as they 
give it up for free. However, our results provide evidence that Internet users indeed 
value their photos beyond free services in return.  
 
4.2 Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Research Suggestions  
Personal information has its value for organizations and users, at least at an abstract 
level. Whereby organizations trade personal information like an asset, individuals take 
a rather passive role in this process. In order to be able to assess current data handling 
approaches, individuals are requested to assign a value to their personal data. However, 
former research investigating users’ valuation of personal data is scattered. Against this 
background, we conducted an experimental study with a NYOP auction allowing 
repeated bids and therefore feedback loops aiming to facilitate the valuation. In total, 
39% of our participants were willing to sell or donate their selfies to the university for 
advertising purposes with a median price of 5€. The applied method can reveal 
individuals’ actual, lowest, and unique valuation and can therefore help Internet users 
to pave the way from a ‘passive spectator’ to an ‘active beneficiary’. 
However, our study comes not without limitations. First, the sample of our 
experimental study consisted of more male than female participants due to the gender 
distribution of our technology-focused university. Although we saw in the data a 
tendency that women were more willing-to-donate, this tendency was not significant. 




study results for other cultures. Thus, we call for a deeper investigation of gender 
differences with a more balanced, international sample. 
Further, as shown by the literature review, studies on the valuation of personal 
information are very context sensitive, meaning that the willingness-to-sell personal 
information and the actual requested value depends strongly on the circumstances under 
which the study was conducted [15]. Thus, we were aiming to optimize these 
circumstances by stating in an easy understandable manner who is buying, what data, 
for which purpose. Further, in our scenario, there were no complex partner structures 
involved, as the university was the only buying party which seems applicable as several 
willingness-to-sell studies were already successfully providing an experimental setup 
in the university environment [e.g., 13, 24, 26]. However, it might be interesting to 
conduct a NYOP auction with a repeated bidding option in another context in order to 
improve the transferability of our results. 
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